讲座题目：Matching and Price Competition in Large Markets（大型市场中的匹配和价格竞争）

主讲人：皇甫秉超 南京审计大学

讲座地点：经管院233

讲座时间：2023年12月21日10:00

讲座内容摘要：

This paper studies the large market implications of impersonal wage competition. In a setting in which there are finitely many categories of firms and workers, firms compete for workers by offering wages, we characterize the unique bidding equilibrium when the market size is large. We show that competition is local: firms only compete against others like themselves, either within the same category or one category above, which coincides with the binding incentive constraints in the corresponding VCG outcome. We also characterize the rate of convergence of the equilibrium to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. In particular, it shows that wage suppression, which can be an issue when the market size is small, quickly disappears when the numbers of firms and workers in each category increases.

本文研究了非个人工资竞争的大型市场影响。在存在有限多类企业和工人的情况下，企业通过提供工资来争夺工人，我们描述了当市场规模很大时唯一的竞价均衡。我们证明了竞争是局部的：企业只与相似的企业竞争，要么是同类企业，要么是高一类企业，这与相应的VCG结果中的约束性激励约束相吻合。我们还描述了均衡向企业最优竞争均衡收敛的速度。特别是，它表明当市场规模较小时可能会出现的工资抑制问题，会在每个类别的企业和工人数量增加时迅速消失。

主讲人学术简介：

皇甫秉超，美国罗切斯特大学经济学博士，南京审计大学助理教授，主要从事信息经济学与微观经济理论研究，论文发表于AEJ-Micro、IJGT、金融研究等国内外期刊。