学术信息 首页 - 学术信息 - 正文
经济学高级研究论坛第212期
2024-06-03
时间:2024-05-31  阅读:

讲座题目: Human (In)Compliance to Extortions: Algorithm Awareness Matters (人类对压榨的(不)服从——算法觉知的影响)

主讲人:杨扬   中山大学岭南学院

讲座时间:2024年6月3日10:30

讲座地点:学院210

讲座内容摘要:

When confronting extortions or oppression, human may take actions to struggle against exploitation even at very high costs, eg. Spartacus Rebellion and workers organizing protests to demand better pay and benefits. Does such incompliance persist when the extortions are implemented by algorithms? This study uses an economic experiment to examine the behavioral responses of human subjects when confronted with an opponent employing an extortionate Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy, either informed (under I condition) or uninformed (under U condition) that their opponent is an algorithm-based computer. The findings reveal a significant divergence in human behavior depending on their awareness of the opponent's algorithmic nature. In treatments with U condition, subjects demonstrated a propensity of incompliance, even at the expense of their own payoff. Conversely, in treatments with I condition, their rate of cooperation—and thus compliance—increased markedly. Further investigation into the relative income status (advantage, parity, or disadvantage) of human subjects vis-à-vis their opponents across various treatments suggested a nuanced impact of algorithm awareness on incompliance behavior. Subjects displayed a pronounced concern for their relative income status over their absolute income under U condition. However, this preoccupation with relative income status was supplanted by the pursuit of absolute payoff when exposed to I condition. This study provides insights into the influence of algorithm awareness on human economic behavior.

当面对压榨时,人类可能会采取行动来反抗——即使要为此付出很高的代价,例如工人会组织抗议要求更好的薪酬和福利。当压榨由算法实施时,这种不服从行为是否仍然存在?本研究通过经济实验,来检验人类在在知情(I条件)还是不知情(U条件)对手是基于算法的计算机的两种情形里,面对采用压榨性零行列式(ZD)策略的对手时是否会展现出行为应对差异。研究结果发现人类对行为会在他们意识/未意识到对手的(基于算法)性质时呈现出显著差异。在U条件下,被试们通常倾向于不服从压榨、即使要以牺牲自己的收益为代价。相反,在I条件下,他们的合作率(即服从率)显著提高。进一步地,当被试与对手在不同实验组中被设置了不同的相对收入地位(优势、平等或劣势)时,我们发现算法觉知对不服从行为有显著的影响。在U条件下,受试者对相对收入状况的关注明显超过了对绝对收益的关注;然而,当暴露于I条件时,这种对相对收入地位的考虑被追求绝对收益所取代。

主讲人简介:

杨扬,中山大学岭南学院经济学副教授,阿姆斯特丹大学经济学博士,研究领域为行为与实验经济学、语言经济学、应用博弈、平台经济。