讲座题目：Coordination and Continuous Choice

　　报告人：杨明

　　报告时间：2017年3月20日10:00—11:30

　　报告地点：经管院B127

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：We study a coordination game where players choose what information to acquire about payoffs prior to the play of the game. We allow general information acquisition technologies, modeled by a cost functional defined on information structures. A cost functional satisfies continuous choice if players choose a continuous decision rule even in a decision problem with discontinuous payoffs. If continuous choice holds, there is a unique equilibrium; if it fails, there are multiple equilibria. We show how continuous choice captures the idea that it is sufficiently harder to distinguish states that are close to each other relative to far away states.

　　简介： 2012年毕业于普林斯顿大学，获经济学博士学位。此前本科与研究生分别就读于南京大学与清华大学。现任职杜克大学Fuqua商学院，金融学助理教授。研究领域为公司金融、理论经济学。其研究成果已发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Accounting and Economics等国际一流学术期刊。

　　论文：https://sites.duke.edu/mingyang/files/2012/10/EIAC_webpage.pdf